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Different methods to elicit risk attitudes of individuals often provide differing results despite
a common theory. Reasons for such inconsistencies may be the different influence
of underlying factors in risk-taking decisions. In order to evaluate this conjecture, a
better understanding of underlying factors across methods and decision contexts is
desirable. In this paper we study the difference in result of two different risk elicitation
methods by linking estimates of risk attitudes to gender, age, and personality traits,
which have been shown to be related. We also investigate the role of these factors
during decision-making in a dilemma situation. For these two decision contexts we also
investigate the decision-maker’s physiological state during the decision, measured by
heart rate variability (HRV), which we use as an indicator of emotional involvement. We
found that the two elicitation methods provide different individual risk attitude measures
which is partly reflected in a different gender effect between the methods. Personality
traits explain only relatively little in terms of driving risk attitudes and the difference
between methods. We also found that risk taking and the physiological state are related
for one of the methods, suggesting that more emotionally involved individuals are more
risk averse in the experiment. Finally, we found evidence that personality traits are
connected to whether individuals made a decision in the dilemma situation, but risk
attitudes and the physiological state were not indicative for the ability to decide in this
decision context.
Keywords: risk preferences, elicitation methods, physiological measures, personality traits, dilemma decision
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of risk aversion in economics is based on theoretical considerations, although
much of its intuition also comes from the daily observation that people avoid taking risks. Both
theoretical and common sense understandings of risk aversion are based on the idea that a (stable)
underlying individual characteristic reflects that some individuals make more risky choices than
others1. Besides providing interesting insights for theoretical analysis, risk attitudes have strong
1The term risk aversion is usually used with an expected utility (EUT) paradigm in mind, where the curvature of the utility
function can be understood as a measure of risk aversion. We will rely on EUT, although more advanced theories exist (e.g.,
prospect theory, PT or rank-dependent utility theory, RDU, seeWakker, 2010). Interpreting risk attitudes using these theories
can be richer than under EUT, but they often require richer data.We address the connection to other theories if our data allows
us to and keep these in footnotes for interested readers.
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implications for many real-life choices. Understanding decision
making under risk is therefore of central importance for
individuals, businesses and policy makers.
However, it is nontrivial to measure risk attitudes of
individuals in an experimental laboratory environment. A large
number of studies documents individual-level inconsistencies
in experimentally measured risk attitudes (Isaac and James,
2000; Berg et al., 2005; Hey et al., 2009; Dave et al., 2010).
Measures obtained from different methods provide conflicting
results and can even differ within one method over time
(Harrison et al., 2005). However, the drivers of instabilities
or inconsistencies of individual risk attitude measures, just as
generally the determinants or sources of risk attitudes, are often
unclear.
Starting from these observations, we connect risk attitude
measures, demographics (age and gender) and personality traits,
the physiological state of experimental decision makers and an
emotionally stressful trade-off decision when presented with a
dilemma. We use elicitation methods by Holt and Laury (HL,
2002, 2005) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (AH, 2009) to measure
individual risk attitudes, as they are designed to elicit risk
attitudes in the same theoretical framework and employ the same
decision variable, which increases comparability. Personality
traits are elicited using the Big Five Inventory (BFI, Goldberg,
1981; John et al., 2008). In the dilemma situation participants
have to decide to save one of two swimmers from drowning after
watching a video describing this situation, which is—like risk
taking—a potentially emotional decision2.
To get physiological data we record the electrocardiogram
(ECG) of participants during the decision making process. We
focus on heart rate variability (HRV) as a physiological measure,
which has been linked to the processing of information in
the brain (Critchley et al., 2003) and reflects an individual’s
sympatho-vagal balance during the decision making process. As
such it can inform about the (physiologically reflected) mental
activity of individuals at the time of the decision and can
link decisions to (potential) emotions. Furthermore, the use of
HRV allows to interpret laboratory-based decision making in
an out-of-laboratory context, as it allows us to collect objective
information without requiring obstructive equipment for our
measurements. In the economic literature HRV has been used
to study decision making in the context of gambling (Meyer
et al., 2000; Wulfert et al., 2005), perceptions of unfair pay
(Falk et al., 2011), in stress when being made accountable
for decisions (Brandts and Garofalo, 2012), tax compliance
(Dulleck et al., 2012), and time preferences (Daly et al., 2009).
Fooken (2015) also shows that HRV effects measured in the
laboratory are noticeable in terms of out-of-laboratory effects,
2Dilemmas are traditionally investigated in philosophical thought experiments.
The dilemma we use is similar to the doctor’s dilemma or a more benign version
of Sophie’s Choice (Greenspan, 1983) in which one person’s life can be saved at
the cost of another person’s life. Marcus (1980) and Greenspan (1983) discuss
emotions and the feeling of guilt that are involved when deciding in a dilemma.
Emotional engagement in dilemma decisions is also emphasized in the study of
neural correlates connected tomoral judgements in dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001),
which finds that emotions play an important role in a (dilemma-related) decision
making process.
arguing for external validity. Dulleck et al. (2011) provide
general guidelines on linking economic experiments and HRV
data. Using physiological data we add to the understanding of
factors underlying risk attitudes which have been studied using
neuroimaging (Hsu et al., 2005; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Huettel et al., 2006; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff et al.,
2008; Polezzi et al., 2010), genetic information (Zhong et al., 2009;
Carpenter et al., 2011; Dreber et al., 2011) and animal behavior
(McCoy and Platt, 2005). The role of emotions on risk taking
has also been argued (Loewenstein et al., 2001) and decisions
involving risk have been connected to emotions such as anger and
anxiety (Gambetti and Giusberti, 2012; Campos-Vazquez and
Cuilty, 2014). Similarly, in connection to the dilemma decision
we are interested in a better understanding of other emotionally
difficult choices.
2. HYPOTHESES
We expect results from our two risk elicitation methods to be
correlated, but to provide different estimates of risk attitude of an
individual (Dulleck et al., 2015). Our first question is therefore
what drives this difference. While drivers of inconsistencies
between results from different risk elicitation methods are
not fully understood, some factors (i.e., demographics and
other personal characteristics) have been shown to influence
risk attitudes generally. Most prominent are findings with
regard to gender and age. Hartog et al. (2002) connect risk
attitudes and demographics; they find that gender and age are
related to risk attitudes. Similar results are also included in
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). The experimental literature also
suggests that females display more risk aversion, although this
result is not always significant (Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
While these factors have been shown to matter in some risk
elicitation methods, results were not the same across methods.
We therefore hypothesize that differences may be based on
a more or less pronounced role of gender and age between
methods.
Different methods could also reflect risk attitudes in different
risk domains. If different elicitation methods give more weight
to measuring certain domains, personality traits may explain
differences between elicitation methods. For example, one
methodmay elicit primarily financial risk taking, anothermethod
risk taking in a health and safety context. Thinking of domain-
specific risk taking is common in psychological research (Weber
et al., 2002), while economists usually consider a more general
(underlying) risk attitude across domains, which is nevertheless
related to domain-specific risk taking (Dohmen et al., 2011).
Personality traits could have a varying influence on risk attitudes
in different domains (Soane and Chmiel, 2005). Nicholson
et al. (2005) study the connection between personality traits
and domain-specific as well as general risk attitudes and find
differences between domains. Based on this previous research
we hypothesize that risk taking will be positively related to
extraversion and openness and negatively related to neuroticism,
agreeableness and conscientiousness.
Another source of differences may be the importance of
the emotional part in taking risky decisions. We use HRV get
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a potential correlate of emotional decision-making3. HRV has
been shown to reflect emotions (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006;
Wallentin et al., 2011) and to correlate with emotional states and
brain activity (e.g., hapiness, anger, and disgust; see Lane et al.,
2009). Another interpretation is that HRV measures mental (and
at least partly emotional) stress (Critchley et al., 2003; Gianaros
et al., 2004), which may influence risk-taking decisions. Porcelli
and Delgado (2009) show that inducing acute stress increases risk
aversion in the gain domain and decreases it in the loss domain.
Morgado et al. (2015) summarize further literature indicating
that inducing stress increases risk aversion. While we cannot
define HRV as a measure of acute stress and as our study is
somewhat different to the ones mentioned above because we
do not induce stress, this could be another channel of how
HRV and risk-taking are related. We therefore hypothesize that
greater risk taking is related to higher emotional engagement as
indicated by HRV. However, if individuals make choices, which
are emotionally not too costly, a weak relationship between risk
taking decisions and HRV measures is also possible. In this
case we may still observe differences across individuals in risk
taking, indicating if more or less stressed individuals take higher
risks.
With respect to the ability to decide in the dilemma we do not
have a clear directional expectation. Emotionally more engaged
individuals may be more likely to make the decision of saving
one of the swimmers, hesitating less. However, they could also
be inhibited in their decision. With respect to other factors we
expect more risk averse individuals to be more hesitant, more
extrovert individuals to make a decision, and more conscientious
and neurotic individuals to hesitate.
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1. Heart Rate Variability Measurement
We use information on heart activity of participants to
understand their physiological state during the decision
making process. Our measurement devices are portable
electrocardiogram (ECG) recorders (AR12) with three electrodes
attached to a participant’s chest. From the recorded ECG
we calculate the heart rate variability for a given period.
HRV as a physiological indicator is mainly used in medical
research (Camm et al., 1996), but also serves as a psychological
indicator, whereas the (HRV) ratio LFHF can be interpreted
as psychologically (or emotionally) induced physiological
stress (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006). In the absence of
major physical activity (such as walking, running, eating
etc.) as in a laboratory environment this indicator conveys
psychological information (Berntson and Cacioppo, 2008);
for example, a higher ratio of sympathetic to parasympathetic
activity, which is reflected in the LFHF ratio (Malik, 2007), has
3We do not hypothesize that HRV is related to decisions such that it explains
behavior; rather, it correlates with and reflects mental states. Using reverse
inference, we interpret the fact that decisions and changes in the physiological state
occur at the same time such that they are causally related. Using reverse inference
in neuroeconomic research is common, but not unproblematic (Phelps, 2009). For
the potentially causal link between HRV and mental activity see below.
been connected to increased mental stress (Berntson et al.,
1994)4.
We use heart rate measurements of our participants over the
course of the experiment to determine their HRV. These give us a
succession of 5 s intervals, which we averaged over the decision
time in our analysis (the time between entering and leaving a
decision screen). Due to unreadable measurements and instances
in which participants made decisions in less than 5 s, data is
missing for some choices. Average HRV is comparable across
the two risk frameworks. Average HRV during the dilemma was
significantly higher than in the two risk frameworks (1.19, N =
65, p = 0.000). An overview table on HRV measures is also
included in the Supplementary Material.
3.2. Experimental Procedures
We ran our experiment in a computer lab over several
sessions on 2 days with a total of N = 75 participants. Ethics
approval was provided by the QUT University Human Research
Ethics Committee (ethicscontact@qut.edu.au) before its start.
All participants provided their written informed consent before
the start of the experiment. We recruited participants from an
online pool of about 2000 students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015)
who had relatively standard characteristics (average age of 21.8
[SD = 0.5], 51% male and mostly business end economics
students). Our invitation included information about the length
of the experiment and that the heart rate of participants would be
measured during the study5. Upon arrival at the lab, participants
were welcomed and asked to put on the heart rate monitor, led
to a computer and asked to go through the experiment at their
own pace; most participants needed about 30 min to do so.When
participants had finished, they were given their payment and
returned the heart ratemonitor. Participants were paid a show-up
fee of five Australian dollars for participating in the experiment
plus earnings based on their decisions in the risk elicitation task
(on average about 30 Australian dollars).
4Interpretations of HRV measures mainly rest on the understanding that the
autonomous nervous system (ANS) is influenced by the sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems and that the influence of the two systems is reflected in
the heart rate. Other systems are active alongside, regulating e.g., respiration, body
temperature, and blood pressure; the influence of these other systems is eliminated
in our HRV data. The sympathetic system is responsible for fight-or-flight
responses, using sympathetic nerves and hormones (particularly adrenaline). The
parasympathetic system controls rest and relaxation through specific pacemaker
cells. Both systems are constantly active parallel to each other, but the degree to
which one of the systems controls the heart rate in a given period varies. The two
systems operate at different speeds. Changes in the heart rate due to increased
sympathetic activity have a longer time horizon compared to parasympathetic
activity. Increases in sympathetic activity have their strongest effect between 5
and 20 s, increases in parasympathetic activity after less than 5 s. This allows
for a decomposition of the heart rate into different frequencies that allow to
observe the varying importance of sympathetic and parasympathetic activity.
Practically, this is done in estimation procedures using waves of different lengths
(or frequencies). Using decompositions into frequencies and studying their relative
influence (power) at a given time allows to identify the effect of the sympathetic and
the parasympathetic system and mediates some of the individual heterogeneity in
heart rate data. More information on the estimation procedures is available upon
request. The ratio of the low frequency (LF, 0.033–0.15Hz) to the high frequency
(HF, 0.15–0.4Hz) mirrors the activity of sympathetic to parasympathetic activity.
5No explicit exclusion criteria were used and our post-experimental questionnaire
which included questions on health conditions also did not indicate any obvious
exclusions.
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Our experiment using software CORAL (Schaffner, 2013)
had five stages. In the first stage participants were asked
personality-related questions of the BFI (John et al., 1991) and
other personality-related questions. The second stage included
a relaxation phase during which participants were shown a
picture of the ocean, heard background sound of the sea rushing
on headphones, were asked to close their eyes, take a sea
shell from the table into one of their hands6, to listen and
relax. The relaxation phase lasted for 5 min and aimed to get
participants down to an undisturbed baseline heart rate. The
following three stages included the two elicitation methods,
the dilemma and a demographic questionnaire as described
below.
3.3. Risk Elicitation Methods
For both risk elicitation methods, participants were first
presented with instructions and had to answer two test questions
before advancing to the first round of decisions. Participants
played both elicitation methods over two rounds. The method
by HL was played first in each round and the method by AH
second7. For final payments one of the two rounds was randomly
selected and from this round one randomly selected choice of
each method was determined for final payments to avoid wealth
and portfolio-building effects.
In the risk elicitation method by HL, individuals choose
between pairs of lotteries. Each pair consists of two lotteries with
two options, one with a higher and one with a lower payoff,
whereas both lotteries have the same probabilities for the low
and high option, but differing dispersion between the outcomes.
Participants were presented with a table of nine pairs of lotteries
and had to decide for each of these pairs if they prefer the option
with more or the one with less dispersion. Going down the table
of these nine lottery pairs, the risk premium of choosing the safer
lottery (the one with smaller dispersion) increases with every row
further down (see HL for further insights on the design of this
method and the Supplementary Material for an illustration). As
the payoffs remain the same for all nine lottery pairs, individuals
chose an optimal switching probability.
The method by AH elicits risk attitudes by letting participants
allocate a (convex risk) budget (CRB) between their probability
of winning (prob) and the amount ω received in case of winning.
Each extra percentage point of winning costs the decision maker
a certain price (price); hence, participants chose their preferred
prob∗ such that their winning amount will be ω∗ = µ − prob∗ ·
pricewithµ being the maximum gain, or budget, that can be won
with corresponding probµ = 0. As in this method participants
face a direct trade-off between allocating their budget µ to either
the probability of winning or the winning amount, given a simple
CRRA utility function, a risk aversion parameter can be inferred
for each of the 18 decisions taken. In our experiment, participants
were informed about the price on the top of the computer screen
and were able to choose prob∗ by moving a slider. At the same
time they were provided in writing with the corresponding pair
6The Purpose of the sea shell was to prevent participants from crossing their arms
and distorting the heart rate measurement by interfering with the electrodes on
their chest.
7There should be no order effect between the methods (Dulleck et al., 2015).
of the gain ωk in case of winning and the selected probk. They
were also shown a picture of the winning probability in a pie
chart and the gain when winning in a bar chart. We refer to
the description of the method in AH and the Supplementary
Material for instructions, more illustration and an example of this
method.
We chose these two methods, as they use a different approach
for eliciting risk attitudes, but have been designed with the same
theoretical framework in mind (a CRRA utility function) and
use the same decision variable (choosing an optimal probability).
Furthermore, HL has been widely used in the literature on risk
elicitation, connecting our experiment to other studies.
3.4. Dilemma Decision
After having finished the risk elicitation tasks, participants
advanced to the fourth stage that included a video of about 1
min length. The video showed a life saver walking to the beach
and then two people drowning in the water. This video was
supplemented by a voice asking participants to imagine being
in the role of the life saver and having to make a decision
of saving one of the two drowning swimmers. Furthermore,
it was said that only one of the two could be saved (“you
will only be able to save one of them”). At the end of the
video, participants automatically advanced to a decision screen
that asked them to save either the person on the left or on
the right from the video they had just seen. Snapshots of the
video showing a hand coming out of the water were included
with the choice options. Furthermore, a button for “more
information” was included; clicking on this option led to a
screen describing more hypothetical options to contemplate
about. However, reading this information required time after
which both swimmers would have drowned. An option to see
even more information (which said that there was no more
information) and the option to return to the decision screen were
also included8.
Participants were given 20 s after entering the decision screen
to make a choice and save one of the two swimmers. However,
participants were not informed about this time limit and didn’t
see the clock ticking down. The reason for this was that we
wanted to identify those individuals who were able to understand
the urgency of the situation and make a decision9. If they
succeeded in this, they were shown a short video in which
the swimmer they had chosen to save was rescued. If they did
not make a decision and exceeded the time limit, a time-out
screen appeared informing them that they had failed to make a
decision.
Finally, participants advanced to a short demographic
questionnaire that included information about gender, age,
student status and some health related measures (to detect
potential problems that could distort heart rate measures),
marking the end of the experiment.
8This screen only served the purpose of using up participant’s time. Many
participants clicked one or even both “more information” buttons, and some of
these still managed to save one of the two swimmers.
9That is, we did not want to study the stressful effect of having to decide under
time pressure, which might affect the decision (Kocher et al., 2013), but the effect
of emotions on the propensity to make a timely decision.
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FIGURE 1 | Distributions of ri-parameters estimated using the two methods separated by gender. (A) AH. (B) HL.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Analysis Separated by Methods
We used two methods for the elicitation of risk attitudes,
providing data that allows us to compare results across methods.
We estimated individual-specific risk aversion coefficients ri
assuming Ui(x) = x
1−ri in an expected-utility (EUT) framework
for each method10. (For AH it is even possible to determine a
coefficient of risk aversion rit for every choice). This allows us
to get an idea about the distribution of individual risk attitudes
for both methods and make some general comparisons between
them. Figures 1A,B illustrate the estimated values for those
participants with SD(rit) ≤ 3 for AH and participants with less
than 4 switching points in HL11.
As can be seen in these overviews, there seem to be differences
between the distributions of individual estimates by gender.
Women seem to bemore risk loving thanmen in the AHmethod,
but more risk averse in the HL method, the second of which
is in line with previous findings (Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
Individual values for the methods, rAHi and r
HL
i , are significantly
correlated at 0.53 for males (N= 31, p= 0.002; Spearman’s
ρ= 0.40, N= 31, p= 0.025), 0.41 for females (N= 29, p= 0.027;
ρ= 0.50,N= 29, p= 0.005), and 0.42 for both males and females
together (N= 60, p= 0.001; ρ= 0.38, N= 60, p= 0.002).
In order to investigate a relationship between gender and
age, and risk attitudes, we included these in our method-specific
estimation procedure12. We also tested for a relationship between
10We extended our analysis beyond EUT for HL assuming a probability weighting
functionwi(p) =
pγi
(pγi+(1−p)γi )1/γi
. We estimated r¯i = .04 (SD = 0.34) and γ¯i = 1.16
(SD = 0.14) using HL. Hence, there is some evidence for probability weighting,
however, we cannot determine a γi significantly different from 1 (representing no
probability weighting) for most participants, probably due to our relatively small
sample. See the Supplementary Material for distributional overviews and more
detail.
11In AH this leads to the exclusion of five individuals and in HL of six individuals.
We use these restrictions as ri-estimates for these individuals do not appear
very meaningful in the context we are using; making these exclusions does not
qualitatively change the overall distribution, but makes the graphs more readable.
12Throughout this paper we use normalized values for all variables in our
estimations.
risk attitudes and some of the personality traits and HRV
measurements. In both methods we used maximum likelihood
estimations for this13. Table 1 reports the results of this
procedure.
The results from the estimation support the first impression
that the role of gender is different between the two methods:
There is no apparent relationship between gender and risk-taking
in AH and a significant relationship in HL, indicating higher risk
aversion in females (0.16, N= 64, p= 0.003). Similarly, there is
no age effect in the AH method and an economically small effect
in the HL method (−0.01, N= 57, p= 0.086).
Adding personality characteristics and HRV measures
does not change the significance level of any of the
variables in the AH method and reports the personality
characteristics as insignificant. However, there is a significant
relationship (−0.23, N= 58, p= 0.088) between rAH and
the HRV ( LFHF ), indicating that individuals who were
physiologically more stressed displayed more risk aversion
in the AH method. This effect is also visible when
correlating rAHi and HRVi for this period (−0.21, N= 60,
p= 0.099).
In the HL method adding information on personality
traits shows that some of the personality characteristics are
significantly related to risk attitudes: There is a positive
connection to extraversion (−0.04, N= 57, p= 0.095) and
agreeableness (−0.04, N= 57, p= 0.098). For extraversion,
this is as expected. For agreeableness, the result is in the
opposite of our expectation, which was based on previous
13See Harrison and Rutström (2008) for a guideline on estimation
procedures. Here likelihood functions used were LHL =∏18
i=1
[
Pr(yi|Xi, α, β)
yi ·
(
1− Pr(yi|Xi, α, β)
)1−yi] for HL with yi = 0 if option
A was chosen, yi = 1 if option B was chosen and assuming Pr(yi = 1|Xi, α, β)
reflected in a normal distribution and LAH =
∏18
i=1
[
probk|X
α
i∑maxprob
j=1 probj |X
α
i
]
for
AH with probk indicating the probability chosen by the decision maker
and probj ∈
[
1, . . . ,maxprob
]
indicating all probabilities not chosen.
For joint estimations in the analysis described further below we used
Ljoint = (LHL)
d · (LAH)
1−d with d = 1 for HL observations and d = 0 for
AH observations.
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TABLE 1 | Determinants of r-estimates for AH and HL.
AH1 AH2 AH3 HL1 HL2 HL3
r 0.24** 0.04 0.16 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.43***
(0.10) (0.55) (0.61) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09)
Female −0.10 0.14 0.16*** 0.13**
(0.20) (0.22) (0.05) (0.06)
Age 0.01 0.00 −0.00 −0.01*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Extraversion 0.00 −0.04*
(0.08) (0.03)
Agreeableness −0.02 −0.04*
(0.12) (0.03)
Conscientiousness −0.06 −0.01
(0.10) (0.03)
Neuroticism −0.08 −0.01
(0.13) (0.02)
Openness −0.14 −0.02
(0.12) (0.03)
HRV ( LF
HF
) 0.23* 0.02
(0.13) (0.05)
N (individuals) 66 66 58 64 64 57
n (choices) 1188 1188 1044 1152 1152 1026
***indicates significance at the 1% level, **5% significance, and *10% significance.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by individuals. The HRV measure represents
average HRV during the AH stage in AH3 and average HRV during the HL stage in HL3.
findings in the literature. Furthermore, there is no clear
evidence that for the HL method HRV is significantly related
to risk taking (−0.02, N= 57, p= 0.703) and the same
is visible when correlating rHLi and HRVi (0.13, N= 60,
p= 0.340)14.
While this physiological measure of the HRV is insignificant
for the HL method, the relationship is significant for the AH
method15. This difference could be due to the fact that the
level of risk taking in HL is relatively stable between the
choices, while the risk taken between AH choices can vary
noticeably: In HL for a slightly risk averse individual the first
and last three rows of the choice list might be straightforward,
while only the pivotal ones are critical in a physiologically
relevant way. For AH in each period a full range of risky
and riskless options can be chosen and most individuals make
both risk-seeking and risk-averse choices during the course
of this method. Hence, individuals vary more in their level
of risk taking and deviations from a potential stress optimal
14An extension of our analysis allowing for probability weighting in HL (see
Supplementary Material) shows a significant relationship between estimates of γ
and HRV and also a potential relationship for r in HL. Nevertheless, this result is
not as easily interpretable, as r and γ are jointly needed to determine an individual’s
risk attitude. However, the result can be seen as indicating that the connection
between HRV and risk attitudes is influenced by probability weighting, whereas
more stressed individuals are more likely to tend toward inverse S shape-type
probability weighting.
15Generally, both have the same direction. The sign of this relationship was visible
throughout most alternative specifications we looked at.
TABLE 2 | Determinants of the joint estimation assuming no structural
difference between the methods.
JOI11 JOI12 JOI13 JOI14 JOI15
r 0.28*** 0.00 0.14 0.27*** 0.14
(0.06) (0.40) (0.33) (0.08) (0.31)
Female 0.00 0.15 0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Age 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Extraversion −0.04 −0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Agreeableness −0.02 −0.05
(0.08) (0.07)
Conscientiousness −0.05 −0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Neuroticism −0.02 −0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Openness −0.07 −0.06
(0.08) (0.08)
HRV ( LF
HF
) 0.15 0.12 0.15
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
N (individuals) 60 60 54 54 56
n (choices) 2160 2160 1944 1944 2016
***indicates significance at the 1% level, **5% significance, and *10 % significance.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by individuals.
decision can be detected in the data16 17. Another possible
explanation is that the two methods measure different types of
risk taking, which could also be reflected in the difference of
their estimated values and their connection to demographics
and personality traits, whereas one is simply more strongly
related to emotions and therefore more strongly reflected
in the physiological state of the decision maker than the
other.
4.2. Analysis of Jointly Estimated Values
for r and of Drivers of Potential Differences
between HL and AH Measures
As the methods by HL and AH were designed with a utility
function of Ui(x) = x
1−ri in mind, ri can be estimated with
data from both methods in a joint procedure. Assuming this
joint structure, we investigated which variables had a significant
influence on the jointly estimated risk attitude ri. Table 2
illustrates different specifications, showing that there is no
variable with a significant impact on r. While this could indicate
that these variables simply have no significant connection to the
risk attitudes, another reason could be that the two methods are
16Indeed, there is evidence that in the AH method in periods where individuals
have a lower LFHF they takemore risky choices. However, this effect is not significant.
17This interpretationmay also be supported by observing the result from including
the variance of HRV instead of HRV in the estimation, which is even more
statistically significant than the HRV variable itself for AH. However, it is again
not significant for HL.
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measuring (slightly) different things, and the joint estimation
washes out some of the effects visible in Table 1.
We therefore investigated differences between the two
methods in estimates for ri and potential determinants of such
differences. We did so assuming U(x) = x1−r+1HL with 1HL
representing the difference between the methods (AH was used
as the baseline and 1HL hence reflects the additional effect of
HL). We estimated r and1HL to identify potential determinants
of differences in measured risk attitudes. However, we cannot
find a significant difference between the methods except for
extraversion which plays a significant role in having a higher
risk attitude in HL compared to AH (0.12, N= 54, p= 0.058).
Hence, there is an unclear difference between the methods,
potentially with any possible difference being blurred by a too
large measurement noise in the data. The results from our
estimations are included in the Supplementary Material.
4.3. Determinants Making a Timely
Decision
We used the life saving dilemma to investigate how gender, age,
risk attitudes, personality traits, and physiological states during
the decision process were related to the ability of individuals to
save a swimmer. Table 3 shows results of probit regressions of
making a decision to save one of the swimmers (or exceeding the
time limit otherwise).
Gender and age had no significant effect on the ability to
make a decision. A similar conclusion is true for risk attitudes
TABLE 3 | Probit regressions of decision to save swimmer.
SLS1 SLS2 SLS3 SLS4
Female −0.05 −0.15 0.23 0.13
(0.30) (0.38) (0.36) (0.44)
Age −0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ri (JOI11 ) 0.18 0.16 0.10
(0.29) (0.27) (0.33)
Extraversion −0.28 −0.61***
(0.19) (0.24)
Agreeableness −0.21 0.13
(0.21) (0.26)
Conscientiousness −0.34* −0.51**
(0.19) (0.24)
Neuroticism −0.38* −0.49**
(0.22) (0.24)
Openness 0.04 0.25
(0.20) (0.25)
HRV ( LF
HF
) 0.00 0.06
(0.18) (0.19)
constant −0.27 −0.70 −0.64 −0.90
(0.59) (0.77) (0.65) (0.84)
N (individuals) 71 61 59 56
n (choices) 71 61 59 56
***indicates significance at the 1% level, **5% significance, and *10 % significance.
(using the joint estimate of an individual’s risk attitude ri). This
is somewhat surprising, as we conjectured a more risk averse
decision maker to be more hesitant. In this sense risk attitudes
measured in the laboratory do not link to this dilemma decision-
making aimed to detect a hesitating character. Personality
traits had an influence on the decision to save one of the
swimmers although their sign is not always as expected (in
specification SLS2: conscientiousness −0.34, N= 61, p= 0.072;
neuroticism −0.38, N= 61, p= 0.093; in specification SLS4:
extraversion −0.61, N= 56, p= 0.011; conscientiousness −0.51,
N= 56, p= 0.032; neuroticism −0.49, N= 56, p= 0.040).
However, it seems that individuals with moderate personality
traits are more likely to make a decision. Finally, there was no
clear relationship between the physiological activity of the 20 s
during which the decision had to be made and the ability to
make a decision. The same is true using simple correlations or
Spearman’s ρ to investigate a correlation. This indicates that
being emotionally more stressed is not related to the ability to
make this decision in time.
5. DISCUSSION
Our aim was to understand how risk attitudes, measured using
two different elicitation methods, were linked to demographics,
personality traits and the physiological state at the time choices
were made. We also wanted to link these latent factors of the
decision making process to the ability to make a decision in
a dilemma. We find that there seems to be a shifter effect
in risk attitude measures between the methods; women are
significantly more risk averse in HL but not in AH. However,
there is no statistically significant general and also no significant
gender effect driving differences between the two methods. For
personality traits there is only evidence that more extraversion
and agreeableness are related to more risk seeking in HL, while
there is no significant effect in AH. Again there is however
no clear indication that personality traits drive the difference
between the methods. We interpret this such that domain-
specific risk taking, which prior literature showed to vary with
personality traits, is no major determinant of differences in risk
attitude measures between the two methods.
We also investigated how risk attitudes and physiological
states were connected, using HRV data as an indicator for mental
stress during the time of decision making. We find that HRV
and risk taking are related in a way that individuals who show
lower physiological responses during the decision take higher
risks in one of the methods (AH). One interpretation of this is
that emotionally less stressed individuals take more risk. This
suggests that risk taking is something not just momentarily
stressful but reflected in a more basic physiological state. Hence,
when emotionally less involved (potentially stressed) individuals
take more risky decisions, this (physiologically) reflects their
general attitude toward risk while making the decision, rather
than their immediate reaction to the risk task at hand. This could
for example mean that the emotional part in risk taking has a
more gradual effect than a prompt emotional reaction which
would be indicated in an immediate bodily response. Although
the effect was not significant in the other method (HL), the
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observed relationship to HRV does not seem to be just an artifact
of one method, as the direction of the effect is the same for
HL and there is a significant effect in HL when allowing for
probability weighting.
Finally, we linked risk attitudes, demographics, personality
traits and physiological states to the ability to make a timely
decision in a dilemma. We find that, except for some of
the personality traits (extraversion, conscientiousness, and
neuroticism) these were not significantly related to making the
decision to save one of the swimmers. Hence, if emotions are
connected to decision making in the dilemma and this emotional
part is reflected inHRV, this would indicate that higher emotional
involvement does not influence the ability to make a timely
decision in our dilemma. We conclude with the finding that
individuals who are less emotionally involved as indicated in
their physiological state during the experiment were also less
risk averse, while the ability to make a dilemma decision was
not significantly linked to the physiological state, but rather
personality-based.
5.1. Further Interpretations
Both findings are interesting for their implications in real life,
for example in companies in which risky (financial) decisions are
taken by individuals. If more emotionally stressed individuals are
more risk averse, this might be worth considering when finding
employees who take decisions involving high risks for these
organizations or their customers. However, this interpretation is
partly speculative and further research is needed, as our study
is only one piece of research and cannot answer if within-
individual deviations in experimental risk attitudes are reflected
in different physiological states between different days or if
our results mainly reflect differences between individuals. Either
result could be worth considering, for example when managing
personnel in companies, selecting certain individuals for specific
positions, or for creating (more or less emotionally stressful)
work environments.
With respect to the decision in the dilemma our results
indicate that it is more the underlying personality which leads
to the ability to decide, while the emotional involvement of
this situation is less important. This could be an interesting
consideration, for example when selecting and managing
employees in jobs where dilemma-like decisions have to
be made, for example in emergency rooms. However,
again further research would need to substantiate our
findings before making recommendations to management.
Nevertheless, our results can, despite their explorative
nature, be interesting for individual and institutional decision
makers for whom understanding emotional decision making
processes is a major factor for personal and organizational
success.
5.2. Limitations
Some limitations of the study should also be acknowledged.
One first is that we study decision making in a laboratory
environment, which can only partially represent decision making
in daily life. However, they may give some indications of
underlying mechanisms in risk-taking decisions, which are also
important outside of the laboratory.
A second limitation can be seen in the correlational nature
of our analysis. That is, while giving first indications, we are
not able to pin down the causal relationship between risk taking
and emotions. A third point is that we use HRV as an indicator
of emotions. While theoretical considerations under the risk-as-
feelings hypothesis as well as previous research on HRV make it
very reasonable to interpret it as reflecting emotional decision
making, without knowing which exact emotions are at work
(which we cannot determine with our given data), our results
stand as one piece of evidence which should be supported by
further studies.
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